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Abstract—Heterogeneity  of  agricultural 
landscapes  may  necessitate  the  use  of  spatially 
targeted instrument combinations to implement the 
social optimum. But compliance with these policies 
may  require  costly  enforcement.  This  paper 
examines the design of agri-environmental policies 
featuring  two  of  the  most  commonly  used 
instruments,  reductions  in  fertilizer  application 
rates  and  installation  of  riparian  buffers.  While 
compliance  with  buffer  strip  requirements  is 
verifiable at negligible cost, fertilizer application is 
only  verifiable  through  costly  monitoring.  We 
derive optimal subsidies for fertilizer reduction and 
buffer  strip  set-asides  and  enforcement  strategies 
for the cases of low and excessive monitoring costs. 
An  empirical  simulation  model  suggests  that 
enforceable  policies  can  come  close  to  replicating 
socially  optimal  crop  production,  nitrogen  runoff, 
and overall welfare without requiring increases in 
overall  subsidy  expenditures,  at  least  under 
conditions characteristic of Scandinavia.  
Keywords—  nutrient  runoff,  monitoring, 
enforcement  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is now widely recognized that agriculture produces a 
variety  of  environmental  services—both  positive  and 
negative—in  addition  to  farm  commodities  [1].  As  a 
result,  there  is  growing  interest  in  reformulating 
agricultural policies in ways that encourage the provision 
of  positive  environmental  services  (e.g.,  scenic 
landscapes,  wildlife  habitat,  cultural  heritage)  and 
discourage  the  provision  of  negative  ones  (e.g.,  water 
quality  impairment  from  fertilizers,  sediment,  and 
pesticides) [2]. Such an interest is especially great in the 
European Union (EU) due to the need to restructure the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in light of budgetary 
pressures and new WTO restrictions and where there is 
less geographical separation between major farming and 
urban  areas  than  in  the  United  States,  Canada,  or 
Australia. Like the United States, many European Union 
countries currently complement CAP area payments and 
LFA  support  with  measures  such  as  environmental 
compliance  requirements.  Area  payments  affect  the 
provision  of  environmental  services  by  helping  sustain 
agricultural  production  on  otherwise  unprofitable  areas 
[3]. Provisions aimed at reducing negative externalities or 
promoting positive externalities are increasingly common 
as well.  Belgium, Finland, Germany and Sweden utilize 
mandatory  or  voluntary  restrictions  on  the  use  of 
fertilizers to reduce runoff and Belgium, Finland, Sweden 
and United Kingdom utilize mandatory or voluntary field 
margin management to promote biodiversity conservation 
and/or limit runoff (for general overview see e.g. [4]).  
  Enforcement  can  be  a  significant  obstacle  to 
effective  implementation  of  these  agri-environmental 
policies (see for example [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], and 
[11].  The  environmental  compliance  requirements  that 
accompany  agri-environmental  subsidies  are  not  self-
enforcing.  They  are  costly  for  farmers  because  they 
reduce  agricultural  productivity  (e.g.,  by  lowering 
fertilizer  application  or  removing  land  from  crop 
production), giving farmers a clear incentive to cheat by 
falsely claiming to have implemented them. There is no 
automatic  verification  because  there  is  no  clearly 
identified  product  delivered  to  the  government  (in 
contrast  to  production  contracts,  e.g.,  where  output  is 
verified  automatically  on  delivery  of  the  product). 
Compliance  monitoring  is  often  costly,  however,  in 
which  case  it  becomes  important  to  devise  efficient 
compliance  monitoring  schemes  to  ensure  that  agri-
environmental policy goals are met. 
  Consider for example the case of fertilizer reduction 
and riparian buffer strip requirements, which are used in a 
number of European countries. Variability in yields due 
to  land  quality,  weather,  varietal  choice,  timing  of 
application,  and  similar  factors  make  it  impossible  to 
determine  compliance  with  fertilizer  reduction 
requirements without soil testing. Similar considerations 
may  apply  to  riparian  buffers  when  it  is  optimal  to 
differentiate buffer strip requirements according to land 
quality and the latter is not observable at negligible cost.  
Soil testing is expensive, so that efficient monitoring and 
enforcement  schemes  have  at  least  the  potential  of 
lowering implementation costs significantly. 
  The  problem  of  how  governments  should  design 
compliance  monitoring  strategies  when  environmental 
compliance  requirements  are  not  self-enforcing  has  not 
received  much  attention  to  date.  The  most  relevant   2 
studies in the literature to date are those of [10] and [11].  
[10] studies the optimal responses of risk averse farmers 
subject to compliance monitoring in the presence of price 
uncertainty.  [10]  shows  theoretically  that  returns  to 
cheating are decreasing in the degree of risk aversion; an 
empirical  illustration  demonstrates  that  compliance  is 
optimal  when  risk  aversion  and  price  uncertainty 
combined are sufficiently great. [11] extends this analysis 
of  optimal  farmer  response  to  targeted  compliance 
monitoring schemes in a two period model in which the 
probability  of  period  2  inspection  is  contingent  on 
observed  period  1  compliance  status.  An  empirical 
illustration demonstrates that such a targeted monitoring 
scheme  can  make  compliance  in  both  periods  the 
dominant strategy when penalties for non-compliance are 
sufficiently high.  Other studies of optimal government 
strategy  have  largely  focused  on  second-best  agri-
environmental  subsidies  in  the  presence  of  hidden 
information when compliance is costless verifiable, i.e., 
when  self-enforcing  contracts  are  possible  (see  for 
example [12], [13], [14], [5], [6], [7], and [8]).  As the 
compliance  requirements  of  agri-environmental  policies 
are rarely self-enforcing, the results of these studies are of 
only limited applicability. 
  This  paper  examines  the  optimal  design  of  agri-
environmental  policies  featuring  two  of  the  most 
commonly used compliance requirements, reductions in 
fertilizer  application  rates  and  installation  of  riparian 
buffers, which differ in terms of compliance monitoring 
cost as well as efficacy. We assume that land quality is 
perfectly  observable  at  negligible  cost  and  thus  that 
compliance with buffer strip requirements is verifiable at 
negligible cost. For fertilizer use we consider two cases.  
In  the  first,  fertilizer  application  is  verifiable  through 
costly monitoring.  In the second, it is non-verifiable or 
verifiable only at excessive cost. In the latter case, buffer 
strip requirements and associated payments are the only 
enforceable policy instrument. We extend the conceptual 
framework  of  [9],  [15],  and  [16]  to  encompass  these 
efficient  monitoring  strategies  given  realistic  limits  on 
penalties.  We  then  apply  that  framework  empirically 
using an empirical model reflecting Finnish agricultural 
and environmental conditions. Details of the theoretical 
and empirical models are presented in [17]. 
 
II. PRODUCTION AND RUNOFF 
 
In [17] we use as a baseline the Ricardian model of [16] 
that  considers  agricultural  production  in  a  region  with 
heterogeneous land quality where farms are located along 
a  river  that  drains  the  area.  The  land  is  divided  into 
parcels which are of the same size and homogeneous in 
land quality. Land quality differs over parcels.   
  It is assumed for simplicity that there are only two 
crops grown  in this region,  both crops produced under 
constant returns to scale technologies with crop 1 better 
suited to lower quality land.  Output of each crop per unit 
of land area, is a function of land quality and the fertilizer 
application  rate.  Crop  production  generates  negative 
environmental  externalities  via  nutrient  runoff.  We 
assume that runoff for each parcel of land is a function  
that depends on the crop, the amount of fertilizer applied 
to the parcel, and the share of the parcel devoted to the 
buffer  strip.  Land  in  agriculture  also  generates  positive 
externalities  in  terms  of  open  space,  preservation  of 
landscapes of important cultural significance, and similar 
environmental  services.  Under  certain  regularity 
assumptions (intuitively, that crop 2 is more profitable at 
land of maximal quality and more responsive to changes 
in land quality), a unique critical quality, can be defined 
at which the land allocation switches from one crop to 
another (see for example [9]).  The optimal buffer strip 
area for each crop decreases in land quality. 
  In the absence of government intervention farmers’ 
decisions do not take into account either negative (runoff) 
or  positive  (landscape)  externalities  from  agriculture. 
Thus, farmers will not maintain buffer strips in such cases 
because they receive no compensation for the lost rent.  
The privately optimal fertilizer application rate similarly 
ignores  marginal  runoff  damage  while  land  of  each 
quality is allocated to the use that generates the highest 
rent without consideration of runoff damage or landscape 
benefits, hence the critical quality of land will be lower 
than the social optimum (see [9] and [16]). 
 
III. A-E PROGRAM COMPLIANCE WITH 
COSTLY MONITORING 
 
The  problem  of  agri-environmental  policy  is  to  find 
instruments  that  induce  farmers  to  reduce  fertilizer 
application rates, to establish buffer strips, and to adjust 
the allocation of land among alternative uses towards the 
social optimum. Analytical results (see [17] for details) 
indicate  that  the  first-best  choice  of  such  agri-
environmental  policies  entails  a  spatially  targeted 
combination of a fertilizer tax (or  subsidy for reducing 
fertilizer  use)  and  a  buffer  strip  subsidy.  It  seems 
reasonable to assume that spatially differentiated buffer 
strip  requirements  and  corresponding  subsidies  can  be 
enforced at low cost: Most countries have detailed soil 
surveys that allow them to devise spatially differentiated 
buffer  strip  requirements  and  buffer  strip  planting  is 
easily verified by annual aerial surveillance or similarly 
low-cost  forms  of  remote  sensing.  In  contrast, 
enforcement  of  fertilizer  taxes,  subsidies,  and/or 
restrictions  on  fertilizer  use  is  problematic.  First-best 
spatially  differentiated  fertilizer  taxes  or  subsidized 
restrictions  on  fertilizer  use  are  unenforceable  without 
costly  monitoring—and  may  be  completely 
unenforceable  if  reliable  soil  testing  methods  are  not 
available—while  second-best  differentiated  fertilizer   3 
taxes and subsidies designed to induce farmers to report 
their  private  knowledge  of  fertilizer  application  rates 
truthfully  are  not  self-enforcing  due  to  the  ease  with 
which secondary markets can be established [9]. 
  In  what  follows,  [17]  extends  the  conceptual 
framework presented in the preceding section to model 
the  kinds  of  agri-environmental  program  compliance 
policies  currently  used  in  Europe  for  reducing  nutrient 
runoff  in  two  situations:  (1)  when  fertilizer  use  is 
verifiable  through  costly  monitoring  and  (2)  when 
fertilizer use is either non-verifiable or verifiable only at 
excessive  cost,  so  that  buffer  strip  requirements  and 
associated  subsidies  are  the  only  enforceable  policy 
instrument.  We  assume  that  land  quality  is  perfectly 
observable  at  negligible  cost  (e.g.,  because  soils  have 
already  been  mapped  or  where  farmers  have  been 
required to report indicators of soil quality such as soil 
characteristics,  yields,  etc.)  and  that  compliance  with 
buffer strip requirements is verifiable at negligible cost 
(e.g., by annual aerial surveillance). 
 
Fertilizer Use Verifiable with Costly Monitoring 
 
Farmers  receive  three  types  of  direct  payments  under 
existing policy regimes in Europe: a subsidy for planting 
a  buffer  strips,  an  area  payment  for  land  allocated  to 
crops and, when applicable, a subsidy for complying with 
restrictions on fertilizer use. 
  Suppose  that  fertilizer  use  is  perfectly  verifiable 
through an annual soil test and, as is commonly the case, 
that  the  penalty  for  being  found  non-compliant  with 
fertilizer  restrictions  equals  the  loss  of  all  subsidy 
payments. Farmers are assumed to be risk neutral, hence 
the threat of detection can be sufficient to ensure perfect 
compliance. We know that the farmer will be indifferent 
between cheating and complying if the expected return 
from cheating equals the certain return from compliance.   
  The socially optimal allocation of land between the 
two  crops  can  be  attained  by  restricting  total  agri-
environmental subsidy payments per unit of land to the 
marginal  value  of  positive  environmental  services 
generated by that land. In what follows, we impose this 
restriction on total subsidy payments. The government’s 
optimization  problem  in  this  case  is  choosing  fertilizer 
use,  buffer  strip  size,  total  runoff,  land  allocation  to 
maximize  the  value  of  agricultural  output  and 
environmental  services  generated  by  land  in  each  crop 
(inclusive  of  buffer  strips)  net  of  runoff  damage  and 
enforcement costs subject to constraints on total runoff 
and land availability.  
  The  presence  of  enforcement  costs  induces  the 
government to rely less on reductions in fertilizer use and 
more  on  buffer  strip  requirements  than  is  socially 
optimal.  The  fertilizer  subsidy  equals  marginal  runoff 
damage from fertilizer use discounted by an enforcement 
cost factor. The fertilizer subsidy is less than the marginal 
runoff  damage  as  a  result,  so  that  fertilizer  use  will 
exceed the social optimum for each crop on each quality 
of land.  The buffer strip subsidy equals marginal runoff 
damage  avoided  plus  the  avoided  expected  inspection 
cost  and  the  savings  from  lower  fertilizer  subsidy  and 
area  payments.    The  buffer  subsidy  exceeds  avoided 
marginal runoff damage as a result, so that buffer strips 
will be larger than the social optimum for each crop on 
each quality of land.  
 
Soil Quality Observable, Fertilizer Use Unverifiable 
 
Now  suppose  that  fertilizer  use  is  unverifiable  by  soil 
tests, e.g., because soil tests are insufficiently accurate to 
determine fertilizer use reliably, or, equivalently, that soil 
testing is just  too expensive to be  worthwhile.  In  such 
cases the government will need to rely on buffer strips 
alone to address problems of nutrient runoff.  Assume as 
before that the cost of compliance monitoring for buffer 
strips is negligible and that total subsidy payments cannot 
exceed  the  marginal  value  of  environmental  services 
provided  by  that  land.  Farmers  will  choose  the 
unregulated level of fertilizer use for each crop on each 
quality of land, and a buffer strip size.  
  The government’s problem is thus to choose buffer 
strip size, land allocation, and total runoff to maximize 
the value of agricultural output net of damage from runoff 
subject to constraints on total runoff and land availability. 
The optimal subsidy in this case is set to induce farmers 
to  allocate  more  land  to  buffer  strips  than  is  socially 
optimal. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
We  use  an  empirical  model  based  on  Finnish  data  to 
evaluate  the  social  welfare  performance  of  policy 
scenarios  using  area  payments,  fertilizer  reduction 
subsidies  or  buffer  strip  payments  alone  or  in  a 
combination. The data come from studies performed on 
clay soils in Southern Finland on which almost all wheat 
and barley production occurs. For details of the empirical 
model see [17]. 
 
A  Parametric  Model  of  Crop  Production  and 
Environmental Services 
 
The  parametric  model  consists  of  the  Mitscherlich 
nitrogen response function for barley (crop 1) and wheat 
(crop 2), an exponential nitrogen runoff function, and a 
function  characterizing  social  damage  from  nitrogen 
runoff. Details can be found in [17]. 
  The  model  contains  40  production  units  of 
differential land quality. The social cost of damage from 
nitrogen runoff is assumed to be proportional to aggregate 
nitrogen  runoff.  The  marginal  cost  of  nitrogen  runoff   4 
damage is assumed to be constant.   
  Verification  of  farmers’  input  use  and  land 
allocation choices is feasible but potentially costly. Buffer 
strip  size  and  planted  crop  area  can  be  verified  at 
negligible  costs  and  we  thus  assume  perfect,  costless 
reporting of planted area and compliance with buffer strip 
requirements  in  this  analysis.  Nitrogen  fertilizer  use  is 
typically monitored by soil nitrogen testing, whose cost is 
not  negligible.  The  cost  of  such  an  inspection  regime 
equals the probability of inspection times the cost of soil 
nitrogen testing, which is € 20 per hectare according to 
the Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 
   
Policy Alternatives 
 
We  use  the  empirical  model  to  estimate  nitrogen 
application  rates,  buffer  strip  widths,  land  allocations, 
farm profit and the social cost of damage from nitrogen 
runoff.    We  use  as  a  benchmark  a  social  optimum 
consisting of farm profit plus the social value of retaining 
land  in  farming  ) (q Aj ,  which  is  assumed  to  equal  the 
current  LFA  payment  for  southern  Finland,  €  168  per 
hectare, for both crops) less nitrogen runoff damage. We 
use this benchmark to evaluate following three alternative 
agricultural policy and agri-environmental policy designs.  
Policy  1,  which  corresponds  to  current  EU  policy, 
consists  of  an  arable  crop  area  payment  without 
enforcement  of  environmental  compliance  requirements 
and an area payment set equal to the current LFA area 
payment in southern Finland, € 168 per hectare for wheat 
and  barley.  Policy  2  combines  optimal  buffer  strip 
payments and a subsidy for nitrogen application reduction 
with  costly  enforcement  of  nitrogen  application 
compliance, as defined by equation 6 of the theoretical 
model. In this policy scenario total subsidy payments are 
fixed, so that the sum of crop area payments, buffer strip 
payments  and  nitrogen  application  reduction  payments 
equals the existing LFA area payment. Policy 3 assumes 
that  nitrogen  use is  either  unverifiable by soil  nitrogen 
testing  or  just  too  expensive  to  be  worthwhile,  so  that 
government relies solely on buffer strips to meet water 
quality  protection  goals.  Optimal  buffer  strip  payments 
are derived under the restriction that the sum of buffer 
strip  subsidies  and  crop  area  payments  is  fixed  at  the 
current LFA area payment for southern Finland.  
 
Base Case Results 
 
As  indicated  by  the  theoretical  analysis,  fertilizer 
application  rates  are  increasing  in  land  quality  while 
buffer strip areas are decreasing in land quality for any 
given crop.  In the absence of environmental compliance 
(Policy 1) farmers use substantially more fertilizer than is 
socially  optimal:  about  15  percent  more  on  barley  and 
about  22  percent  more  on  wheat.  Moreover,  it  is 
profitable for farmers to plant wheat on some land that 
would be planted in barley in the social optimum so that 
difference  in  fertilizer  use  on  this  land  is  even  higher.  
And of course it is unprofitable for farmers to set aside 
land  in  buffer  strips  hence  they  will  not  do  so  unless 
forced to.  As a result, nitrogen runoff under Policy 1 is 
over a third higher than the social optimum, suggesting 
that  nitrogen pollution of surface  water is a significant 
negative externality of farming in this region. 
  The  combination  of  fertilizer  and  buffer  subsidies 
with costly enforcement (Policy 2) is quite successful in 
lowering  nitrogen  runoff.  Fertilizer  application  rates 
under  this  policy  are  only  about  2  percent  higher  than 
socially  optimal  for  barley  and  4  percent  higher  than 
socially  optimal  for  wheat.  Buffer  strip  widths  are 
substantially higher than socially optimal, on the order of 
27-37 percent higher for both crops, with the difference 
for  each  crop  narrowing  somewhat  as  land  quality 
increases, and 30 percent higher overall.  Some additional 
reductions in overall fertilizer use and increases in overall 
buffer  strip  area  are  due  to  extensive  margin  effects: 
Under this policy barley is planted on some land that is 
socially optimal to plant in wheat. As a result, nitrogen 
runoff is actually lower than the social optimum by about 
1 percent. 
  The  level  of  monitoring  required  to  enforce 
compliance  is  quite  low,  averaging  0.75  percent  for 
barley  and  1.69  percent  for  wheat.  The  minimal 
probability  of  inspection  needed  to  ensure  complete 
compliance  is  increasing  in  land  quality,  reflecting  the 
fact that the gains from cheating are increasing in land 
quality.  Overall,  however,  enforcement  costs  are 
negligible.  The  reason  is  straightforward.    Subsidy 
payments  are  extremely  large  relative  to  income  from 
farming (and hence the additional income from cheating), 
so that it takes only a small probability of detection for 
the  expected  loss  of  all  subsidy  payments  to  equal  the 
gains  from  non-compliance.  This  result  suggests  that 
environmental  compliance  can  be  achieved  at  low  cost 
even  when compliance  monitoring is costly, at least in 
areas  where  farm  subsidies  are  already  generous.    The 
policy modeled here changes the composition of subsidy 
payments but not the overall level of subsidies; the only 
additional cost relative to current expenditures is that of 
monitoring, which can be kept quite low because fines for 
those caught cheating are quite large relative to the gains 
from cheating. 
  As one might expect from the fact that it uses two 
instruments to address the two objectives of maximizing 
farm income and minimizing environmental damage from 
nitrogen runoff, Policy 2 comes quite close to achieving 
the socially optimal welfare level, falling only 0.1 percent 
below it. Underproduction of crops relative to the social 
optimum is balanced by overcontrol of nitrogen runoff.  
The resulting net discrepancy in social welfare is entirely 
attributable to the cost of enforcement  which, as noted 
above, is quite low in this case.   5 
  Policy 3, in which fertilizer reduction subsidies are 
unenforceable (or too costly to enforce), features buffer 
strips  that  are  substantially  higher  than  the  social 
optimum, about 31 percent, but not much higher than a 
policy  in  which  fertilizer  reduction  subsidies  are 
enforceable  at  relatively  low  cost  (only  about  0.5 
percent).  Fertilizer use is about 18 percent higher than 
the social optimum.  It is slightly lower than fertilizer use 
in  the  absence  of  environmental  compliance  (Policy  1) 
because it replicates the socially optimal land allocation.  
As a result, nitrogen runoff under this policy is only about 
9 percent higher than the social optimum, suggesting that 
buffer  strips  are  highly  effective  at  reducing  nitrogen 
runoff.  Income from crop production above the social 
optimum largely balances damage from nitrogen runoff in 
excess  of  the  social  optimum,  so  that  overall  social 
welfare is almost 99 percent of the social optimum. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The results of the base case analysis suggest that policies 
that provide enforceable subsidies for agri-environmental 
compliance  measures  while  keeping  total  subsidy 
payments fixed at current levels can come quite close to 
replicating  the  social  optimum,  at  least  under  Finnish 
conditions. Sensitivity analysis was used to examine the 
relative  performance  of  these  policies  under  the 
conditions of greater heterogeneity in land quality than in 
Finland. The sensitivity analysis assumed an upper bound 
on land quality 60 percent higher than the base case while 
keeping the lowest land quality level fixed.  The mean 
yield of wheat with a 60 percent increase in maximum 
land quality is close to the highest country-level average 
yields in the European Union as a whole.  The results of 
this sensitivity analysis are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. 
  With higher overall land quality, the social optimum 
features more land planted in wheat and less land planted 
in  barley.  Higher  land  productivity  increases  both 
fertilizer productivity and the opportunity cost of land set 
aside  from  crop  production,  hence  the  socially  optimal 
use  of  fertilizer  is  substantially  higher  and  the  socially 
optimal use of buffer strips is substantially lower than in 
the base case. As a result, runoff in the social optimum is 
about 26 percent higher than in the base case. 
  In the absence of environmental compliance (Policy 
1),  farmers’  use  of  fertilizer  exceeds  socially  optimal 
levels  both  because  of  higher  than  optimal  fertilizer 
application rates on each crop and because more land is 
planted to wheat than is socially optimal. The degree of 
overuse  remains  about  the  same  relative  to  the  social 
optimum,  however:  In  the  absence  of  environmental 
compliance, fertilizer use is about 15 percent higher than 
the social optimum on barley, 22 percent higher than the 
social optimum on wheat, and 20 percent higher than the 
social optimum overall, while runoff is 34 percent higher 
than the social optimum. 
  As in the base case, the combination of fertilizer and 
buffer  subsidies  with  costly  enforcement  (Policy  2)  is 
quite  successful  in  lowering  nitrogen  runoff.  Fertilizer 
application  rates  under  this  policy  are  about  2  percent 
higher than socially optimal for both barley and wheat.  
As in the base case, buffer strip widths are substantially 
higher than the social optimum, an average of 28 percent 
higher  for  barley,  18  percent  higher  for  wheat,  and  24 
percent higher overall.  With the increase in overall land 
quality  it  becomes  efficient  to  rely  relatively  more  on 
buffer strips and less on fertilizer reductions, as indicated 
by the fact that subsidy payments for buffer strips and 
fertilizer  reductions  are  roughly  equal  in  this  scenario 
whereas  in  the  base  case  fertilizer  reduction  subsidy 
payments  are  three  times  as  large  as  buffer  subsidy 
payments.  Also  in  contrast  to  the  base  case,  the  land 
allocation  under  this  policy  is  the  same  as  the  social 
optimum. 
  The  level  of  monitoring  required  to  enforce 
compliance remains quite low: The optimal probability of 
inspection averages 0.85 percent for barley, 2.86 percent 
for wheat, and 2.02 percent overall.  As in the base case, 
the  reason  is  again  that  subsidy  payments  are  so  large 
relative to crop income that it takes only a small chance 
of being caught to make the expected loss to equal the 
gains  from  cheating.  The  optimal  probability  of 
inspection is nevertheless substantially higher than in the 
base  case.  Higher  overall  land  quality  means  higher 
returns  to  cheating,  hence  more  intensive  and  costly 
enforcement. Thus, the cost of enforcement is more than 
double that under the base case. 
  As  in  the  base  case,  the  use  of  two  instruments 
allows this policy to come close to replicating the social 
optimum. Slight overproduction of crops relative to the 
social optimum is almost completely balanced by slight 
undercontrol  of  nitrogen  runoff.  The  resulting 
discrepancy between social welfare under this policy and 
that under the social optimum is extremely low, less than 
a hundredth of a percentage point. As in the base case, 
this discrepancy is attributable to the cost of enforcement, 
which remains quite low in relative terms. 
  Also as in the base case, Policy 3, which does not 
utilize fertilizer reduction subsidies, features buffer strips 
that are higher than both the social optimum.  The relative 
discrepancy between the use of buffer strips under this 
policy and the social optimum is larger than in the base 
case—about 41 percent in this scenario compared to 31 
percent in the base case. The relative difference in the use 
of buffer strips between this policy and Policy 2 is also 
larger, a result attributable to the higher opportunity cost 
of  land.  Fertilizer  use  under  this  policy  is  again  lower 
than in the absence of environmental compliance (Policy 
1) because, as in the base case, this policy replicates the 
socially optimal land allocation. Less control is exercised 
over  nitrogen  runoff  is  lower  than  in  the  base  case, 
however: Nitrogen runoff is 15 percent higher than the 
social  optimum  in  this  scenario  compared  to  only  9   6 
percent higher in the base case. Higher income from crop 
production balances higher damage from nitrogen runoff 
to a slightly lesser extent than in the base case, but social 
welfare is still almost 99 percent of the social optimum. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
There  is  growing  interest  in  expanding  the  scope  of 
agricultural policies to include environmental compliance 
requirements,  such  as  incentives  for  providing  positive 
environmental  externalities  from  farming  and  reducing 
negative  ones.  Heterogeneity  of  agricultural  landscapes 
typically  necessitates  the  use  of  spatially  targeted 
instrument  combinations  to  implement  the  social 
optimum. Most agri-environmental policies considered to 
date  in  the  literature  are  not  self-enforcing,  making  it 
necessary to consider enforcement cost in policy design. 
  This  paper  examines  the  optimal  design  of  agri-
environmental  policies  featuring  two  of  the  most 
commonly used environmental compliance requirements, 
reductions in fertilizer application rates and installation of 
riparian  buffers,  which  differ  in  terms  of  compliance 
monitoring  cost  as  well  as  efficacy.  Compliance  with 
buffer strip requirements is verifiable at negligible cost 
while  fertilizer  application  may  be  verifiable  through 
costly monitoring, or may be verifiable only at excessive 
cost.  In  the  latter  case,  buffer  strip  requirements  and 
associated  payments  are  the  only  enforceable  policy 
instrument. 
  We  develop  a  theoretical  model  of  agricultural 
production  and  nitrogen  runoff  in  a  region  with 
heterogeneous land quality. We use the model to derive 
optimal  subsidy  regimes  for  buffer  strips  and  fertilizer 
combined for the case where fertilizer use is verifiable at 
reasonable cost and for buffer strips alone for the case 
where fertilizer use is not verifiable at reasonable cost.  
The  former  case  requires  enforcement  via  probabilistic 
monitoring with penalties for cheating, which we assume 
to be the loss of all agricultural subsidy payments;  we 
derive the minimum probabilities of detection that ensure 
perfect  compliance  by  risk  neutral  farmers  for  each 
quality  of  land.  In  both  regimes  (as  well  as  the  social 
optimum) a fixed area payment is used to ensure that total 
subsidy  payments  equal  the  marginal  value  of  positive 
amenities  generated  by  land  in  agriculture,  so  that 
implementation  of  either  policy  means  a  change  in 
budgetary  outlays  equal  only  to  expected  enforcement 
costs. Both policy regimes are characterized by  greater 
reliance on buffer strips and greater use of fertilizer than 
in the social optimum. 
  We  examine  the  performance  of  these  policies 
empirically  using  a  simulation  model  that  replicates 
conditions characteristic of Scandinavia. Nitrogen runoff 
in the absence of environmental compliance measures is 
substantially higher than the social optimum. The policy 
that combines fertilizer reduction subsidies, buffer strip 
payments,  and  random  monitoring  via  soil  testing 
performs  quite  well:  Overcontrol  of  nitrogen  runoff 
balances  underproduction  of  crops  almost  exactly  in 
value terms while the cost of enforcement is extremely 
low due to the fact that subsidy payments (hence losses 
from  being  caught  cheating)  are  so  large  relative  to 
income from crop production that infrequent monitoring 
is sufficient to deter cheating. Buffer strip requirements 
are  substantially  higher  than  the  social  optimum.  The 
policy  that  relies  on  buffer  strip  payments  alone  also 
performs well, albeit not as well as a policy that combines 
buffer strip payments with fertilizer reduction subsidies.  
Sensitivity  analysis  indicates  that  the  relative 
performance of these policies remains the same as overall 
land quality increases. 
  These  results  suggest  that  reorienting  current 
European  agricultural  policies  away  from  income 
supports  toward  payments  for  environmental 
improvements  can  achieve  significant  improvements  in 
environmental  quality  with  small,  if  any  increases  in 
overall  spending  by  substituting  payments  for  buffer 
strips,  fertilizer  reductions,  and  similar  measures  for 
portions of current area payments. Heterogeneity of land 
quality and the resulting need for targeted subsidies did 
not  prove  to  be  a  significant  obstacle  in  the  cases 
considered  here.  It  would  be  interesting  to  examine 
whether  these  results  carry  over  to  situations  featuring 
greater  diversity  of  crops  and  land  quality.   7 
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